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The irresistible charm of the Microfoundations, or  
                                    the overwhelming force of the discipline’s Hard Core? 
 
Microfoundations is a relatively recent term in economics, with a life that hardly 
exceeds half a century. It is in fact encapsulating a metaphor, which ordains the relationship 
between microeconomics and macroeconomics. According to the metaphor, 
microeconomics constitutes the foundations of macroeconomics. It follows that 
macroeconomic theory without microeconomic foundations is unreliable and defective. The 
lack of foundations in any construction, theoretical as well as physical, makes it prone to 
collapse and, therefore, untrustworthy if not downright dangerous and worthless. 
Metaphors tend to shape and direct thinking. They can be very powerful in framing the 
process of thought and enabling it to make connections and inferences on the basis of 
analogies. By the same token, they block or at least make less likely and promising the 
exploration of possible alternatives outside their own framing of an issue. When they are not 
perfectly apposite, and especially if they harden into a dogma, they can become a barrier to 
fresh thinking and the development of a discipline. Consequently, the appropriateness of a 
metaphor is all important. 
Is the microfoundations metaphor an appropriate one or is it dangerous and 
misleading? John King, who has recently written an excellent book on this subject, argues 
convincingly that it is the latter.1 In fact, anyone interested in the question of 
microfoundations, and especially if one is a heterodox economist, can do no better than 
read King’s book, which has to be the starting point for any future dialogue in this field. We 
also find convincing John King’s position that the appropriate metaphor for the relationship 
between micro and macro is that of a bridge between the two rather than foundations of 
one by the other. Macroeconomics is not built on and does not need foundations provided 
by microeconomics; each one is constructed on separate foundations and what is required is 
a bridge between them. 
King considers in some detail the history of the microfoundations metaphor and shows 
how this form of reductionism, which has counterparts not only in the philosophy of science 
but also in sociology, political theory and history, has taken root in economics and soon 
hardened into a dogma. The microfoundations dogma is condemned by King for two 
reasons, which render problematic all reductionist projects in every scientific field. The first 
one has to do with downward causation or effects that the whole has on the parts, which 
often tend to characterize complex systems. The whole or higher‐level constructs may affect 
smaller units in ways, which constrain, shape or motivate their behavior. The structure of the 
whole is absent in the parts and this is what makes the whole more than the sum of its parts. 
                                                             
1 See, King J. E. (2012), The Microfoundations Delusion: Metaphor and Dogma in the History of 
Macroeconomics, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham. 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It is also the reason that the behavior of the parts does not suffice to provide an explanation 
of the behavior of the whole. This is reflected in the second related reason, which concerns 
the fallacy of composition. Here again, what is true and applies to the constituent parts 
cannot be aggregated and loses its validity, when applied to the whole. The whole is 
characterized by emergent properties, which are not contained in the parts and may be not 
only different but even negate the properties characterizing the parts, by standing in 
complete opposition to them. King lists a number of such fallacies in economics, the best 
known of which is the paradox of thrift.2 
 
          Nevertheless, the fascination exerted by the microfoundations project, is not easy to 
overcome. The ideal of “unity of science”, in which logical contradictions or inconsistencies 
do not exist and all knowledge is firmly based on the most fundamental elements, seems to 
be extremely appealing not only in economics but throughout the scientific community. 
The literature debating this matter is huge and extends beyond the philosophy and 
methodology of science to practically every field of scientific discourse. Its extent and 
complexity are such, that it would be presumptuous for the ordinary economist to have 
strong, let alone dogmatic, views on this issue. 
What we propose to do here, is to consider the microfoundations question in 
economics from a practical, common‐sense point of view. In economics, the strength and 
tenacity of the microfoundations project  seems to spring from a number of special factors, 
which tend to reinforce its universal primary attractiveness. The first three of these, increase 
its appeal acting like carrots while the fourth one has a dissuasive role and acts more like a 
stick. The three that enhance its appeal are adequately covered by King but the last one, to 
which he pays little attention, may be the most important one.   
The first factor, is the strong predilection of the economics discipline, at least since the 
neoclassical revolution in the end of the nineteenth century, for methodological 
individualism. This is the notion that social phenomena result from the actions of individual 
agents and can be fully explained only by reference to the views and actions of individuals.3 
Methodological individualism clearly implies the methodological primacy of micro‐
theory. It follows that, the reconstitution of the unity and integrated character of economic 
theory, which had been the proud achievement of neoclassical economics and distinguished 
the discipline from the other social sciences (until the appearance of macroeconomics), must 
respect this methodological desideratum. If economic theory is to be unified, this must be 
done in a way that preserves the primacy of micro‐theory. Microfoundations do exactly this: 
                                                             
2 This, as Keynes has noted, was clearly perceived 300 years ago by Bernard Mandeville  in his 1714 Fable of the 
Bees.  
 
3 The notion has obtained popular notoriety from Margaret Thatcher’s proclamation that “ there is no such thing as 
society; there are individual men and women, and there are families”. 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they assert the primacy of micro‐theory in unifying economic theory. According to King, 
establishing microfoundations means that all propositions in macroeconomics must be 
reducible to microeconomic propositions relating to the behavior of individual agents. It is 
this belief that King calls “the microfoundations dogma” and shows convincingly to be 
untenable. From this, he draws the conclusion that, neither the primacy of micro‐theory can 
be established and justified nor is it essential for economic theory to be unified. 
Though we are in agreement with King’s conclusion, we think that his interpretation of 
microfoundations is unnecessarily strict. It is possible to show, we believe, that the 
microfoundations notion is untenable and undesirable, even on a less strict and ambitious 
interpretation of their aim. Such a demonstration, which we will attempt below, clearly 
strengthens the case against microfoundations: If they are indefensible on a less demanding 
interpretation, they are a fortiori untenable on a more stringent one. It also closes the 
escape route for the defense of microfoundations on the grounds that they never had such 
an ambitious aim (i.e., of making all macroeconomic propositions reducible to 
microeconomic ones) and that King set up a straw man in order to easily demolish it. 
The excessive strictness of King’s interpretation, becomes immediately apparent in the 
case of the post‐Keynesians’ reference to microfoundations. Sidney Weintraub, who was the 
first economist to use in print the term from 1956, certainly did not claim that all 
macroeconomics is or should be reducible to microeconomics and rejected this dogma (as is 
well recognized by King). The same is true for Paul Davidson’s claim that the 
microfoundations for Post‐Keynesian economics have been provided by Marshall and 
Keynes, or Philip Arestis’ view that Eichner’s model fulfills this task or, finally, those who 
argue that the microfoundations are contained in Kalecki. None of them has stated that all 
macroeconomic propositions in Post‐Keynesian economics are reducible to the 
microeconomic theory to be found in Marshall, Keynes, Eichner or Kalecki. What they seem 
to be saying is, that such microeconomic theory is consonant with and can easily be 
integrated within Post‐Keynesian economics. 
King is, of course, quite right in pointing out that compatibility and ease of integration 
do not constitute foundations. A suitable metaphor might be that of a bridge or some other 
metaphor, which highlights the assimilation potential of such micro‐theory into Post‐
Keynesian economics. The use of the microfoundations metaphor is unfortunate and plays 
into the hands of the dedicated supporters of methodological individualism. It is ideally 
suited to methodological individualism but quite inappropriate to anyone who denies the 
primacy of micro‐theory and is only interested in the compatibility and even, to the extent 
that it is possible, the consistency between microeconomics and macroeconomics. 
The second factor increasing the attractiveness of the microfoundations metaphor, is 
related to the political ideology of classical liberalism, with which the discipline was 
associated practically from its beginnings. Classical liberalism emphasized the precedence of 
individuals and its main concern was the liberation of individuals from the shackles of the 
(mercantilist pre‐modern) state. The microfoundations project is not just in accord with this 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ideology but has become its theoretical mainstay.  General equilibrium theory is the highest 
achievement of the micro approach in full conformity with the microfoundations project.4 It 
demonstrates that perfectly competitive markets are capable, albeit under quite strict 
conditions, of generating a socially optimum configuration of relative prices. It thus 
vindicates Adam Smith’s conjecture that such markets can operate like an “invisible hand”, 
so as to bring about the socially most desirable allocation of products and resources. This is 
popularly interpreted in a vulgar fashion, as “proving” the state’s inability to improve on the 
outcomes of an economy comprised of perfectly competitive markets.5  
The third factor enhancing the appeal of microfoundations, springs from the gradual 
professionalization of economics and its establishment as an academic discipline in 
university studies. Given that physics was the most developed scientific field, economics 
aspired to imitate it by using its methods and approach for the study of society. This  
“physics envy” promoted not only the use of mathematics in economics but also the 
emulation of physics, at least as it was popularly understood, in seeking more fundamental 
explanations of nature, at the “micro” level of the atom or even below. 
The fourth factor is also due to the professionalization of the discipline but in its more 
mature stage. By the time (1970s) that the microfoundations project (and name) became 
firmly entrenched and effectively a dogma, economics was already established as an 
academic discipline throughout the world. Professionalization implied a canonization of the 
discipline’s “hard core”, in Lakatos’ sense,6 together with the creation of internal hierarchies. 
Such hierarchies or “high priesthoods” were already in place by the 1970s, with the best 
American universities being at the top of the professional pyramid. What was taught there, 
set the professional standard and became the required knowledge everywhere else. By the 
same token, training outside or contrary to the “hard core” made practically impossible an 
academic career. Respect of the “hard core”, as specified and supervised by the “high 
priests” was, therefore, a sine qua non for a successful career.  PhD students were quite 
aware of the high risk involved in being critical of the “hard core” and those wishing to 
pursue an academic career learned to practically identify it with doing economic “science”.7 
What is the “hard core” and how does it affect the microfoundations project? Even if 
there is some haziness at the edges, it is clear that the “hard core” includes certain tenets 
and methods, which define the academic practice of contemporary economics. A distillation 
                                                             
4 The claim that the general equilibrium approach is the highest achievement of economic theory has been 
canonized by Scumpeter. See, Schumpeter, J.A. (1954), History of Economic Analysis, Allen and Unwin, London. 
5 In contrast, macroeconomics was associated, from its much later beginnings in the late 1930s, with the 
malfunctioning of markets and the corrective potential of the state. This disaccord with the basic ideological 
tenets of the discipline was a handicap right from the start and may be a motive even today for seeking the 
replacement of macroeconomics by Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium modelling.  
6 See, Lakatos, I. (2001), The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Cambridge University Press; also, 
Latsis, S.J. (1976), Method and Appraisal in Economics, Cambridge University Press. 
7 This is still the case and the «hard core» today has as much (if not more) power as it had then. An example of 
how present‐day prospective young academics experience the power of the «hard core» can be found at 
economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2011/04/what‐i‐learned‐in‐econ‐grad‐school.html. 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of its essence is as follows: In economic explanation, there are two types of optimizing 
agents, individuals (mostly consumers but also workers) and firms. Consumers maximize 
utility (subject to a budget constraint) and firms maximize profits (subject to the technical 
conditions of production). On the basis of such maximization, demand and supply schedules 
can be specified for each product and these determine relative prices throughout the 
economy.  The associated methods involve the construction of mathematical models, which 
formulate most questions as problems of maximization under constraints, and the 
generalized use of demand and supply schedules for the determination of prices, both at the 
levels of markets (partial equilibrium) and the whole economy (general equilibrium). These 
elements are closely interrelated and they buttress and fortify one another. It might be 
argued that additional tenets and methods ought to be considered as part of the “hard core” 
but it can hardly be disputed that the ones above, which form an integrated whole, are 
undoubtedly included and cannot be dissociable from it.  
It is evident that the “hard core” consists essentially of micro‐theory. Consequently, it 
has an affinity with and cannot fail to favor the vision and aim of the microfoundations 
project. There are, of course, reservations about the feasibility of the project and these have 
been expressed by a number of prominent neoclassical economists (e.g. Paul Samuelson and 
Milton Friedman, as noted by King). But even if these reservations are heeded by some 
economists, for many others the microfoundations project remains a desirable vision, which 
may be possible to achieve someday. In the meantime, a less strict and ambitious version of 
the microfoundations that seems more defensible can prove useful to the support of the 
“hard core”. A defensible version of microfoundations may be promoted and effectively 
serve to shield the “hard core” from fraying, as well as to impose discipline and restrain 
younger colleagues from straying out of the canonical pathway.  
This less ambitious interpretation of the microfoundations does not require that all 
propositions in macroeconomics are reducible to microeconomics. It requires instead that 
the central tenets and methods of the “hard core” be respected in macroeconomics. Given 
that these are essentially micro‐theory, the resulting macroeconomics may be taken to be 
dependent on microfoundations. In other words, the metaphor is nearly imperceptibly 
changed, so that it may still apply. Even if macroeconomics cannot be fully constructible 
from or reducible to microeconomics, it is constructed by and is heavily dependent on 
material provided by microeconomics. The microfoundations project is that micro‐theory  
should provide the main, if not all (as would be preferable), building blocks for the 
construction of macroeconomics. In this way, the microfoundations project becomes 
tantamount to showing the greatest possible respect for the “hard core”. The metaphor is 
still applicable and acquires even more force since it serves a twin purpose: It not only 
directs and shapes thinking in the manner of any attractive metaphor but it also disciplines 
thinking to respect the “hard core”.8 
                                                             
8  It is thus undoubtedly an important constitutive metaphor, which determines what makes sense in the 
discipline’s discourse and what does not. King is perfectly aware of the constitutive (rather than just 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The microfoundations metaphor can be criticized, given this less strict interpretation, 
only by a frontal attack on the “hard core”. This is obviously a big and difficult task, which is 
beyond our ability to bring to a fully conclusive end. What we will attempt in the rest of this 
paper is to shake the confidence in the validity of the “hard core”. If the “hard core” is 
problematic and of doubtful validity, then the microfoundations project loses its purpose. 
Losing trust in the “hard core” removes the reason for privileging micro‐theory over 
macroeconomics. As a result, King’s position that the appropriate metaphor is one of a 
bridge between micro and macro (a strong and reliable bridge that is still in need of 
construction), gains ground and can more easily become acceptable. Though our attempt 
may not lead to a complete rout of the microfoundations dogma, it is hoped that it will 
weaken it and, in any case, it will hopefully make clear why we find it unconvincing.  
The problems with the “hard core”  
The “hard core”, as presented above, is unconvincing in most of its aspects. Here, we 
will examine the most important under two headings: 1) Maximization of utility; and 2) 
maximization of profits. Appeal will be made to work and results, not only of unorthodox 
schools of thought but also by prominent neoclassical economists, which are quite 
subversive of the “hard core” and, presumably for exactly this reason, rather neglected by 
the orthodoxy. 
1) Maximization of utility 
The use of this notion in economics has its origins in political philosophy and, more 
specifically, in J. Bentham’s school of utilitarian philosophy, which argued that the aim of 
government ought to be the maximization of collective utility.  It became a central notion in 
the neoclassical revolution, which explained prices as the outcome of the interaction 
between individual buyers maximizing utility and individual sellers maximizing profit in 
perfectly competitive markets. Since it is clearly a crucial part of the neoclassical “hard core”, 
it has been argued that it is futile to criticize it.9  
Nevertheless, an unobservable concept that is held beyond question is not particularly 
convincing to anyone who is not obliged to share the neoclassical faith. Especially since a 
new discipline, i.e., behavioral economics, has sprung up during the past quarter century in 
radical opposition to it. Based on the pioneering experimental work of psychologists D. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
pedagogical or heuristic) nature of the microfoundations metaphor for neoclassical economics and its role in 
delineating the Lakatosian «hard core». He even describes in a footnote the reaction of a «very smart» young 
neoclassical theorist who could hardly distinguish the metaphor from the «hard core», finding the need for 
microfoundations  evident  and  not requiring justification. An explanation of the  smart young academic’s 
reaction may be that he interpreted the microfoundations metaphor less strictly than King, in the manner 
suggested above. 
9 For example, L. Boland considered it to be a metaphysical statement (his term for the «hard core») and wrote 
thus: «The research program of neoclassical economics is the challenge of finding a neoclassical explanation for 
any given phenomenon ‐‐ that is, whether it is possible to show that the phenomenon can be seen as a logical 
consequence of maximizing behavior ‐‐ thus, maximization is beyond question for the purpose of accepting the 
challenge». See, Boland, Lawrence A. (1981) «On the Futility of Criticizing the Neoclassical Maximization 
Hypothesis», American Economic Review, 71, 1031‐6. 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Kahneman and A. Tversky, behavioral economics has amassed considerable evidence that 
decisively undermines utility maximization as a realistic basis for the explanation of human 
behavior. This new discipline initially appeared in business departments and, though it 
covers common ground with economics, it intellectually owes nothing to economic theory 
and everything to psychology and experimental sciences. “In fact, until about 1990, it was 
not uncommon to get a paper returned from a journal (usually after a delay of about a year) 
with a three sentence referee report saying “this isn’t economics””.10 Even today, the vast 
majority of the economics profession has no understanding and little awareness of 
behavioral economics research. So far as the neoclassical “hard core” is deemed worth 
defending, behavioral economics will not be seen as valid research but as a threat to 
“economics”. 
Maximization of utility for many economists is the exclusive basis for the derivation of 
downward‐sloping demand curves (the “law” of demand)11. Given the plausibility and 
widespread evidence of a negative relationship between quantity demanded and price, its 
logical derivation from utility maximization, which is demonstrated often in great detail in all 
microeconomics textbooks, facilitates acceptance and reinforces belief in utility 
maximization. But this seemingly strong support of this part of the “hard core” by another 
(i.e., the ubiquitous demand and supply model) is quite illusory. Leaving aside the 
problematic nature of the demand and supply construction,12 it is not true that the inverse 
relationship between quantity demanded and price requires acceptance of utility 
maximization.  
In a brilliant and unintentionally subversive early article, Gary Becker has shown that 
utility maximization and indeed rationality are redundant for the derivation of the “law” of 
demand. The so‐called “law” can be derived even if behavior is irrational and non‐
maximizing. Thus, even on the assumption that behavior is based on habit or is random, the 
relationship between quantity demanded and price is an inverse one and the “law” of 
demand still holds.  
Becker shows that a negatively inclined demand curve holds not only in the case of 
consumption goods markets, when consumers are not rational, but also in markets for 
inputs demanded by irrational firms, i.e. firms which do not maximize profits. In both cases, 
the reason is that there exist definite opportunity sets which are facing both types of 
irrational buyers and these opportunity sets are dependent on prices. The opportunity set 
                                                             
10 Camerer, C. F., Loewenstein, G. and Rabin, M. (2004), Advances in Behavioral Economics, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton NJ, p. xxi. The authors are careful not to antagonize or threaten orthodox economists, who are 
institutionally in a much stronger position, (presumably in the hope that they will overcome their distrust and become 
acceptable to economics departments) but it is difficult to see how their research could possibly be reconciled with 
the orthodoxy’s «hard core». 
11 Gustav Cassel was one of the few economists who treated downward sloping demand curves as a «primitive» 
empirical fact, rejecting the need for its explanation on the basis of utility maximization. See, Stigler G. J. (1950), 
«Development of Utility Theory II», Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 58, No. 5, 373‐396. 
12 Skouras, T. (1980), “The Tools of Demand and Supply: Good for an Economist or a Parrot?” in Freris A. and Skouras 
T. “Against Demand and Supply: Two Essays”, Thames Papers in Political Economy, Summer. 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facing consumers is determined by their income budgets, while the opportunity set for firms 
is given by the requirement that they avoid losses (i.e., the set is limited to decisions which 
involve non‐negative profits).  A higher price for a good or input restricts its availability 
relative to others within the relevant opportunity set. As a result, the change in the 
opportunity set will render impossible certain previous decisions and will force some 
irrational buyers to reduce the quantity demanded, since the formerly desired higher 
quantity is not any more affordable.  
Gary Becker’s demonstration that the “law” of demand holds independently of utility 
maximization by rational agents, is based on the heterogeneity of the irrational agents. It 
would not be possible to derive on the basis of a representative agent, in the manner of the 
microfoundations project, and shows that the properties of aggregates (which, in this 
instance, are product or input markets rather than the macroeconomy) cannot be obtained 
by the analysis of a representative individual. The importance of heterogeneity is further 
confirmed by another relatively neglected result by W. Hildenbrand.13 In 1994, Hildenbrand 
showed that the “law” of demand is an effect of aggregation, which is ensured so long as the 
agents (i.e., buyers) are sufficiently heterogeneous.  
On the basis of the above results, it may be concluded that utility maximization is not 
necessary for the derivation of the “law” of demand. But is it sufficient? Does utility 
maximization lead inescapably to an inverse relationship between price and quantity 
demanded? The Sonnenschein‐Mandel‐Debreu theorem demonstrates that the general 
equilibrium model cannot be guaranteed to have a unique solution. This is considered to 
have far‐reaching implications.14 One of these implications seems to be, that utility 
maximization by rational individual agents does not assure the “law” of demand holding in 
all markets. Consequently, utility maximization appears to be neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the derivation of the “law” of demand. 
2)  Maximization of profit 
Maximization of profit, as the aim of business enterprise, is a notion that for a time 
seemed more secure than utility maximization, as the aim of consumers and workers. The 
reason may be that it was popularly held far longer and conformed to the beliefs of the 
wider public. A reinforcing factor was probably the coincidence of view held by professional 
economists, on the one hand, and those generally hostile to academic economics, on the 
other. This latter group includes all those adhering to every shade of Marxist and, more 
generally, anti‐capitalist creed. Consequently, this unholy alliance strengthened conviction in 
the notion of profit maximization, dominated public opinion and made it seem practically 
unassailable. 
                                                             
13 Hildenbrand, W. (1994), Market Demand: Theory and Empirical Evidence, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. 
14 Rizvi, S. Abu Turab (2006), "The Sonnenschein‐Mantel‐Debreu Results after Thirty Years" History of Political 
Economy (Duke University Press) 38. 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The first serious challenge to the notion was made in 1932, with the publication of a 
book by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means.15 The authors noted that the rise of the modern 
corporation resulted in a separation of ownership from control. A new class of professional 
managers emerged, which took over control of the firm from the legal owners, the 
shareholders. The latter had no role in the actual decision‐making and day‐to‐day running of 
the firm, which had become the exclusive prerogative of the managers. In addition, the 
owners tended to be numerous and dispersed, with very limited power to discipline the 
management and ensure that it acts in their own interest. The owners’ interest may well be 
that the firm is run so as to maximize profit, but profit maximization may not necessarily be 
in the interest of the managers. It is not difficult to think of reasons why there can be 
divergence of interest between owners and managers. 
This seminal work has spawned a huge literature in the following years, which 
continues to the present. The best‐known examples of theories about firm behavior, which 
argue that firms maximize an objective other than profit, exactly because this different 
objective best serves the interests of managers, are probably those proposed by William 
Baumol,16 Robin Marris17 and Oliver Williamson18.  Baumol argues that managers’ interests 
are best served when firms maximize sales, while Marris makes a case for the firm’s 
balanced growth rate, which involves the maximization of the growth rate of the demand for 
the products of the firm along with the growth of its supply of capital. Finally, Williamson 
does not directly opt for a specific managerial interest but goes back to the orthodox micro 
principles. He thus claims that, just like any other individual economic agent, managers will 
attempt to maximize their utility and, therefore, the behavior of the firm will be dictated by 
whatever maximizes the utility function of the managers. He then proposes some plausible 
managerial interests to be included in the managerial utility function. 
The separation of ownership from control is a real problem not only for the positive 
theory of the firm but also for the design of appropriate norms of corporate governance. The 
rapidly expanding recent literature regarding corporate governance takes as its starting 
point, the recognition that management does not necessarily pursue the interests of the 
shareholders and implicitly rejects the view that firms actually maximize profits. The same 
position is prevalent in the relevant theoretical and applied work, which comes under the 
generic name “the principal – agent problem”.  
But doubt about profit maximization does not concern only the question whether 
profit is the objective that is maximized. It also concerns the question whether maximization 
                                                             
15 Berle A. and Means G. (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Transaction Publishers, (2nd edition, 
Harcourt, Brace and World, N. York, 1967).  
16 Baumol W. J. (1959), Business Behaviour, Value and Growth, Macmillan, (revised edition, Harcourt,Brace and World, 
N.York, 1967). 
17 Marris R. (1963), «A Model of the Managerial Enterprise», Quarterly Journal of Economics. Also, Marris R. (1964), 
Theory of «Managerial» Capitalism, Macmillan. 
18 Williamson O. E. (1963), «Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior», American Economic Review, as well as 
Williamson O. E. (1964),The Economics of Discretionary Behavior, Prentice‐Hall. Williamson has later written a number 
of books attempting in a convoluted manner to reconcile discretionary managerial behavior with profit maximization. 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(not just of profit but of any other objective) is of relevance to what firms actually do. The 
first serious doubt was sown by an empirical survey reported in 1939 by Robert Hall and 
Charles Hitch.19 They interviewed 38 business executives about their methods for setting 
prices and found that the majority of surveyed firms set their prices according to simple 
rules of thumb. Instead of equating marginal revenue to marginal cost, so as to maximize 
profit, they found that “… there is a strong tendency among business men to fix prices 
directly at a level which they regard as their “full cost”.” More recent surveys confirm these 
findings and show that, contrary to what profit maximization dictates, the majority of 
managers take fixed and sunk costs into account when setting prices.20 
This initial challenge was followed by behavioral models of the firm, which used what 
was known from empirical and experimental work about decision‐making in organizations. 
Herbert Simon paved the way with a seminal article in 195521, which introduced the notion 
of bounded rationality, and was followed by Richard Cyert and James March, who presented 
the first fully developed behavioral theory of the firm.22 In their book, they argued that 
“satisficing” rather than “maximizing” drives managerial decision‐making. 
The empirical research and the use of empirically obtained knowledge from other 
sciences, which was advocated by the behaviorists as the way forward in understanding the 
behavior of firms, failed to make much of an impression on orthodox economics.23 It found 
followers mostly in business schools, as was the case with later behaviorist research that 
undermined utility maximization’s pretence to explain human behavior. Moreover, no 
systematic effort was ever made to test the predictions of the profit maximization 
hypothesis against empirical evidence. For example, the prediction that a change in the tax 
rate on profits will not affect pricing, does not seem to have ever been seriously tested.  
It may not be surprising that profit maximization has not been subjected to strong  
tests, given its important position in the “hard core”. After all, critical tests that conclusively 
refute any significant theory in economics, are extremely difficult to find. But even the 
demonstration that a theory is inconsistent and logically implies patently implausible claims 
about the real world, does not seem capable to invalidate crucial elements of the “hard 
                                                             
19 Hall R. and Hitch C. (1939), «Price Theory and Business Behaviour», Oxford Economic Papers, 2, 12‐45. 
20 Al‐Najjar N., Baliga S. and Besanko D. (2008), «Market Forces Meet Behavioral Biases: Cost Misallocation and 
Irrational Pricing», Rand Journal of Economics, 39(1), 214‐37. 
21 Simon H. (1955), «A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice», Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69(1), 99‐118. Other 
important articles by Simon on this topic are «Theories of Decision‐Making in Economics and Behavioral Science», 
American Economic Review, 1959, and «On the Concept of Organizational Goal», Administrative Science Quarterly, 
1964. 
22 Cyert R. M. and March J. G. (1963), A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Prentice‐Hall. 
23 This was despite the award of the economics Nobel Prize to H. Simon in 1978. The economics Nobel  Prize awarded 
to D. Kahneman in 2002, may also prove to have little effect on the profession (especially as Kahneman is on record 
stating that never in his life did he attend a single class in economics). 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core”, such as the notion of profit maximization. A long‐standing demonstration of this kind 
is witnessed in a remarkable very brief article by Tibor Scitovsky.24  
Scitovsky’s focus is on the individual entrepreneur personally running his business 
rather than on managerially‐run big corporations. It may be argued that departures from 
profit maximization associated with the latter cannot invalidate the results of general 
equilibrium analysis. This is because big corporations do not fit the specifications of firms 
operating under perfect competition, which is essential to general equilibrium analysis.  But 
Scitovsky’s owner‐operated firm operating under competitive conditions is as close as 
possible to the archetypical firm of the general equilibrium model. Consequently, the 
implications of profit maximization by such a firm are of relevance and cannot be ignored by 
general equilibrium analysis. And these implications are  “rather special”.25 
The main assumption on which Scitovsky’s results are based, is the reasonable one 
that the firm’s output, receipts and hence profits depend on the entrepreneur’s activity or 
work time. He then argues that entrepreneurs, like consumers and workers, make decisions 
(in this case about how long to work) so as to maximize their utility, which is clearly what 
micro principles would dictate. He thus exposes an inconsistency in general equilibrium 
analysis, which posits unnecessarily and without justification a different motivation 
concerning the entrepreneurial firm from that of the consumers.  
The entrepreneur’s utility function might reasonably be taken to depend on profit (or 
net income) and leisure, which must be balanced against each other in order to maximize 
utility. Less leisure would normally require more profit as compensation while beyond a 
point, defined by the entrepreneur’s physical stamina and need for rest and sleep, no 
increase of profit or net income would suffice to compensate for any further reduction in 
leisure. It is then evident that profit maximization is an unlikely outcome and certainly 
cannot be guaranteed to emerge if entrepreneurs maximize utility. An entrepreneur who, 
while maximizing utility also maximizes profit, must have a strange utility function indeed. 
Such an individual needs no compensation in order to reduce his leisure; he has no interest 
in leisure and is only interested in profit. Since he gets no utility from leisure and all his utility 
comes from profit (which can only increase if he works more), he is constantly in danger of 
working himself to death.26  
                                                             
24 De Scitovszky T. (1943), «A Note on Profit Maximization and its Implications», Review of Economic Studies, 57‐60. 
Unlike the inadvertent subversiveness of G. Becker’s article, the subversiveness of Scitovsky’s short note is artfully 
disguised to make it seemingly supportive of the orthodoxy. (Note that the article is under the original name, which 
was later simplified to Scitovsky).  
25 Scitovsky uses this euphemism and not only refrains from calling them implausible but even calls them «very 
plausible». A cynical view may be that this is the price a young immigrant economist (Scitovsky was less than 33 years 
old when the article was accepted, had just enlisted in the US army and was still three years away from his first 
academic appointment) had to pay for having a publication by a top journal of the profession. 
 
  
26 Scitovsky muddies the water by unecessarily complicating the relevant diagram and arguing that the strangeness of 
the required utility function consists in its implication of a constant marginal utility of money or, even more bizarrely, 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Despite the contorted way that Scitovsky presents his conclusions and his 
unwillingness to criticize the notion of profit maximization,27 it should be evident that his 
analysis is destructive to the neoclassical “hard core”. A straightforward interpretation of his 
results is that 1) it is inconsistent with the basic assumption of micro analysis to assume 
profit maximization in the case of small owner‐run firms and 2) if this is corrected and utility 
maximization is assumed instead, it is implausible that profit is maximized. Consequently, 
the choice is between inconsistency and implausibility. In any case, the damage to the 
notion of profit maximization is considerable. Not only is there strong theoretical and 
empirical evidence that profit maximization does not fit big corporations controlled by 
managers and operating under oligopolistic conditions but also it is   inappropriate for small 
owner‐run firms operating under competitive conditions. Since these latter are   one of the 
two types of economic agents on which the general equilibrium model relies, the logical 
demonstration that assuming profit maximization in their case is either inconsistent or 
implausible, is a serious blow also to  general equilibrium analysis.  
Concluding comments 
It has been argued that the appeal of the microfoundations metaphor in economics is 
strongly supported by the considerable force of the “hard core”. This is especially the case, if 
the microfoundations metaphor is interpreted in the sense of respecting the essentially 
micro‐theoretical nature of the “hard core” and relying, to the greatest possible degree, on 
its basic tenets and methods in the construction of macroeconomics. It does not then suffice 
to show that all macroeconomic propositions cannot be constructed from or reduced to 
microeconomic ones, as this strict interpretation of the metaphor tends to miss the point 
and motivation of the microfoundations project. The project is in effect part and parcel of 
the overarching strategic aim of defending and ensuring the dominance of the “hard core”. 
The two, microfoundations and “hard core”, have become closely intertwined and the 
orientating and disciplining role of the latter is of crucial importance in driving the former. 
In these circumstances, questioning the microfoundations dogma is tantamount to 
confronting the “hard core”. The examination of the two most fundamental tenets of the 
“hard core”, shows that they are open to criticism and suffer from serious weaknesses. 
Maximization of utility is not only contradicted by a lot of experimental and other empirical 
evidence but it is also neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing the “law” of demand. 
Profit maximization is also found wanting both on theoretical and empirical grounds, in the 
case of large corporations under managerial control, and is inconsistent or implausible in the 
case of small owner‐run firms. Consequently, privileging  micro over macro theory does not 
ensure sound foundations and the relationship between microeconomics and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
of a zero income elasticity of supply of entrepreneurship. He then glorifies the single‐minded interest in profit and 
absolute disregard for leisure as the essence of the puritan ethic, which extols the virtues of frugality and industry. 
«The puritan psychology of valuing money for its own sake, and not for the enjoyments and comforts it might yield, is 
that of the ideal entrepreneur as he was conceived of in the early days of capitalism», ibid. 
27 «... we set out, not to justify or criticise the assumption that entrepreneurs aim at maximising profits, but to make 
its implications explicit», ibid.  
  13 
macroeconomics is better captured by and more fruitfully analyzed in terms of the bridge 
metaphor.  
